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Abstract
Effective field theories have been a very popular tool in quantum physics for
almost two decades. And there are good reasons for this. I will argue that effec-
tive field theories share many of the advantages of both fundamental theories
and phenomenological models, while avoiding their respective shortcomings.
They are, for example, flexible enough to cover a wide range of phenomena,
and concrete enough to provide a detailed story of the specific mechanisms
at work at a given energy scale. So will all of physics eventually converge
on effective field theories? This paper argues that good scientific research
can be characterised by a fruitful interaction between fundamental theories,
phenomenological models and effective field theories. All of them have their
appropriate functions in the research process, and all of them are indispens-
able. They complement each other and hang together in a coherent way which
I shall characterise in some detail. To illustrate all this I will present a case
study from nuclear and particle physics. The resulting view about scientific
theorising is inherently pluralistic, and has implications for the debates about
reductionism and scientific explanation.
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1 Introduction
There is little doubt that effective field theories are nowadays a very popular tool in
quantum physics. They are almost everywhere, and everything is considered to be an
effective field theory (EFT). Particle physicists, for example, even take a supposed-to-
be fundamental theory such as the celebrated Standard Model of the electromagnetic,
weak, and strong interactions to be an EFT (Meissner, 1992). Nuclear physicists sys-
tematically derive low-energy EFTs from quantum chromodynamics (a theory which
is part of the Standard Model) to account for the dynamics of protons and neutrons
in atomic nuclei at low and intermediate energies (Van Kolck, 1999). And solid state
theorists formulate age-old models such as the BCS theory of conventional super-
conductivity in the language of EFTs (Shankar, 1999). Even gravitational physicists
seem to be infected by the EFT-virus: they consider the general theory of relativity
to be the starting point of a power-series expansion, to which higher-order quantities
that are still invariant under general coordinate transformations have to be added,
to account for the physics at higher energies (Donoghue, 1994a,b). The resulting
EFTs include quantum corrections to Einstein’s theory which are considered to be
footprints of a quantum theory of gravity, a theory we do not yet have, but which we
might be able to find (or divine) by following the EFT programme.
EFTs account for the physics at a given energy scale by relying only on those enti-
ties which are relevant at that scale. These entities are, for example, quarks, leptons
and the gauge bosons in the Standard Model, pions and nucleons in nuclear physics
at not too high energies, and Cooper pairs in the theory of conventional supercon-
ductors. Using these effective degrees of freedom makes computations tractable and
provides some intuitive understanding of what is physically going on at the energy
scale under consideration. The resulting descriptions are very accurate; this indicates
that the effects of the physics at higher energies do not really make a difference at
lower scales in these cases: the physics at high energies is ‘decoupled’ from the physics
at low energies. Its effects are contained in a few parameters of the low-energy theory.
The formalism of EFTs makes all this more precise. Besides, there is a systematic
and controlled way to derive low energy EFTs from a more fundamental high energy
theory.
For a long time, the criterion of renormalisability was considered to be a sine
qua non for any acceptable physical theory. After all, we want our theories to give
finite results and if higher orders in a perturbation expansion diverge, the theory is in
trouble. Renormalisation is a way to ‘get rid’ of these infinities, but it turns out that
many EFTs cannot be renormalised and are therefore, according to the old view,
in trouble. Their appraisal requires that we reconceptualise what renormalisation
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amounts to. This reconceptualisation took place in the 1970s; it is a consequence
of a realistic (as opposed to a formalistic) interpretation of the cut-off parameter in
quantum field theories and of the insights of renormalisation group theory.
Besides their value in research, EFTs also played a role in a recent debate among
scientists which was, however, in the end mainly about funding issues. In this de-
bate, particle physicists (most prominently Steven Weinberg) advocated building a
Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), an extraordinarily expensive particle accel-
erator, which should help theorists find the ‘final theory’ (Weinberg, 1993). In the
end, the US Congress did not make this dream come true. Weinberg’s opponents,
such as the solid state physicists Philip W. Anderson and James Krumhansl, argued
convincingly against this project. Since he could not point to technological spin-offs,
Weinberg’s main argument for the SSC was the very foundational character of par-
ticle physics: ‘Particle physics is in some sense more fundamental than other areas
of physics’ (1987, p. 434). It is more fundamental because it is ‘on a level closer to
the source of the arrows of explanation than other areas of physics’ (ibid., p. 437).
Anti-reductionists, on the other hand, point to the autonomy of the different levels of
organisation. All these levels have their own ontology and their own laws, so why not
call them fundamental as well?1 It is not an easy task to make more precise what it
means exactly that different levels of organisation are autonomous. However, within
the programme of EFTs, the notion of quasi-autonomy can be given a precise mean-
ing and the relation of one level of organisation to a deeper level can be studied. We
will come back to this issue below and discuss its consequences for the reductionism
debate.
Despite the great importance of EFTs in actual scientific practice and in an im-
portant debate among scientists, philosophers of science have not paid much attention
to EFTs. Following a seminal (though philosophically controversial) paper by Cao
and Schweber (1993), some articles have been published which mainly focus on the
issue of renormalisation and on the role of the renormalisation group.2 In 1996, a
remarkable conference on the conceptual foundations of quantum field theory took
place at Boston University. Its participants included many of the main contributors
to the development of quantum field theory and to the EFT programme.3 At this
conference a lot of attention was paid to EFTs. A full philosophical appraisal of
EFTs and their consequences is still missing however. This is the aim of this article.
Philosophers of science have discussed theories and models a great deal. EFTs
1This debate is carefully reconstructed in Cat (1998).
2See the articles by Huggett and Weingard (1995), Robinson (1992), Cao (1993), Schweber
(1993a), and the more general articles by Schweber (1993b, 1995).
3The proceedings of this conference are published in Cao (1999).
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share similarities with both of them. My first goal will therefore be to locate EFTs in
the ‘conceptual space’ defined by these tools. I will do this by looking at the functions
of theories, models, and EFTs in the research process and conclude that EFTs share
many of the functions of theories and models. Theories and models are, however,
also an indispensible tool of scientific research and I will defend a pluralistic account
of scientific theorising on the basis of a detailed case study. My second goal is then
to draw some more general conclusions from my reconstruction of scientific practice,
namely about the issues of reductionism and scientific explanation.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some
historical background and introduces the concept of EFTs. Section 3 points out the
functions of, and relations between, theories, models, and EFTs on the basis of a case
study from nuclear and particle physics. Philosophical conclusions concerning plu-
ralism, reductionism and scientific explanation are then drawn in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 summarises my main points.
2 The Emergence of Effective Field Theories
Although the first paper on EFTs appeared only in 1979 (Weinberg 1979, 1980b), the
general idea behind it is much older. As early as in 1936, the German physicists Hans
Euler and Werner Heisenberg calculated the process of photon-photon scattering at
small photon energies within the framework of the quantum theory of fields developed
by Paul Dirac a couple of years earlier. Euler and Heisenberg derived a non-linear
modification of Maxwell’s equations which could however be interpreted in an intu-
itive way. Another early example of an EFT is Fermi’s theory of weak interactions.
Both theories will be discussed in Section 2.1. For a long time, however, theories
such as the ones by Euler, Heisenberg and Fermi were not taken seriously because
they were not renormalisable. Only after a ‘change in attitude’ (Weinberg) among
physicists—mainly due to the development of renormalisation group techniques—was
it possible to consider non-renormalisable theories as full-blown scientific achieve-
ments. To arrive at the current conception of EFTs, one more step was required.
In 1975, Appelquist and Carazzone derived a theorem according to which under cer-
tain conditions the heavy particles in a theory decouple from the low-energy physics
(modulo a renormalisation of the parameters of that theory). I will sketch these de-
velopments in Section 2.2. Finally, I present two ways of applying EFTs, viz. the
bottom-up approach and the top-down approach, both of which have a variety of
applications in physics.
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2.1. Two early examples
This section introduces two early examples of an EFT, the Euler–Heisenberg theory
of photon-photon scattering (Section 2.1.1) and the Fermi theory of weak interactions
(Section 2.1.2). Both theories exhibit typical features of an EFT which are compiled
in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.1. The Euler–Heisenberg theory
Soon after Dirac presented his first attempts towards a quantum theory of fields,
Euler and Heisenberg applied this theory to the process of photon-photon scatter-
ing.4 The authors did not worry much about the fact that Dirac’s theory had various
conceptual problems at that time. Quite to the contrary, by working out interesting
applications of the theory and by exploring its consequences, Euler and Heisenberg
hoped to get a hint in which direction one has to look in order to find a satisfactory
quantum theory of fields. In a letter to Wolfgang Pauli, Heisenberg wrote about a
similar situation a couple of months earlier:
In respect to quantum electrodynamics, we are now in the same state as we
were in 1922 in respect to quantum mechanics. We know that everything
is wrong. But in order to find the direction in which we have to depart
from the present state, we have to know much better the consequences of
the present formalism.5
Following this line of thought, the motivation of Euler and Heisenberg’s joint work
was to get an understanding of the consequences of Dirac’s provisional formalism in
order to find ways to improve it.
Photon-photon scattering is a typical quantum electrodynamical process which
has no classical analogue. It does not occur in classical physics because of the linear-
ity of Maxwell’s equations (‘superposition principle’). In quantum electrodynamics,
however, the superposition principle does not hold. Now, photons can interact and
the elementary process, for the discovery of which Euler attributes to Otto Halpern
and Peter Debye, is this: the two photons scatter and create an electron-positron
pair which then decays back into two photons, respecting energy and momentum
conservation. This effect will lead to a modification of Maxwell’s equations for the
vacuum by adding non-linear terms to it.
4The first paper on this subject matter was published by Euler (1936); Heisenberg and Euler
(1936) contains a considerable simplification and generaliation of Euler’s calculation.
5Letter to W. Pauli dated 25 April 1935; quoted from Cassidy (1995, p. 416), my translation.
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Figure 1: Feynman diagram for photon-photon scattering.
Euler and Heisenberg did not tackle the full problem but considered a special case.
While Breit and Wheeler calculated the cross section for this process for high photon
energies, in which real electrons and positrons are created, Euler and Heisenberg’s
attention focused on photons with energies well below the production threshold of
electrons and positrons.
But even this is not an easy problem. In the modern language of Feynman di-
agrams, the ‘box-diagram” depicted in Fig. 1 has to be calculated.6 Euler and
Heisenberg, of course, did not know Feynman’s efficient methods, but they calcu-
lated essentially this diagram and so we use it here to visualise the corresponding
elementary process. Since the process is of the fourth order, it is clear that there
are considerable mathematical difficulties which show up when calculating the tran-
sition amplitude. These difficulties even show up when Feynman diagrams are used
explicitly. 7
For the details of the calculation we now follow the modern reconstruction given
by Itzykson and Zuber (1980, pp. 195f). This work is focused on Euler and Heisen-
berg (1936), which is a simplification and generalisation of Euler (1936). The modern
covariant formulation goes back to Schwinger (1973, pp. 123–134). If one requires
(1) U(1) gauge invariance, (2) Lorentz invariance and (3) parity invariance, any La-
grangian density which should account for the process of photon-photon scattering
6Besides this diagram, there are two other diagrams which contribute in the same (fourth) order
in perturbation theory; they are obtained by permutating the external photon lines, cf. Jauch and
Rohrlich (1976, Ch. 13).
7For an exact calculation, see Jauch and Rohrlich (1976, Ch. 13).
6
must have the following structure:
Leff = −1
4
F µνFµν +
a
m4e
(F µνFµν)
2 +
b
m4e
F µνFνσF
σρFρµ +O(F 6/m8e). (1)
Here me is the mass of the electron, and F
µν is the field-strength tensor of the elec-
tromagnetic field. a and b are dimensionless constants which have to be determined.
Note that there are no electron degrees of freedom in Eqn (1). This is not nec-
essary, however, since the considered process is purely photonic. Electrons do not
show up explicitly. The first term in Eqn (1) is the well-known contribution of ‘free’
photons. All other terms are part of a systematic expansion in 1/me, respecting the
symmetries mentioned above. The non-linearity of these terms reflects the violation
of the superposition principle. For low photon energies (Eγ  me), it suffices to
consider only the first three terms in this expansion.
All information about this energy regime is therefore contained in the constants
a and b. But how can these constants be determined? One possibility is to do the
explicit expansion of the original Lagrangian density of quantum electrodynamics by
‘integrating’ out the electron degrees of freedom. There are efficient calculational
tools available now which, however, presuppose the path-integral formulation which
was not available when Euler and Heisenberg performed the calculations. Instead,
Heisenberg and Euler (1936) applied elegant mathematical technique which essen-
tially led to the same result. However, in the original publication, Euler (1936) chose
another way. He calculated a special case of the process under consideration in two
ways: exactly and by using the effective Lagrangian density given by Leff . Compar-
ing both results, he obtained the following values for the two constants:
a = −α
2
0
36
, b =
7α20
90
, (2)
with the fine-structure constant α0 = 1/137. In terms of the electric and magnetic
field strengths (E and B), the resulting effective Lagrangian density has the following
form:
LEHeff =
1
2
(E2 −B2) + 2α
2
0
45m4e
[
(E2 −B2)2 + 7(E ·B)2
]
. (3)
This expression has been the basis of many subsequent calculations; it is still used
today (see, for example, Becker, McIver and Schlicher (1989) for a quantum optical
application).
2.1.2. The Fermi theory
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Another historical example is Enrico Fermi’s theory (1933, 1934) of weak interactions
which was developed soon after Wolfgang Pauli suggested the existence of the neutrino
as a way to account for the continuous beta spectra discovered by James Chadwick in
1914. These spectra gave rise to various speculations, including Niels Bohr’s famous
suggestion of giving up energy conservation in order to account for them.
Following the model of quantum electrodynamics, Fermi developed a theory which
uses Pauli’s hypothesis and describes the elementary process n→ p+e−+ν¯e quantum
field theoretically. In this reaction, a neutron (n) decays in a proton (p), an electron
(e−) and an electron anti-neutrino (ν¯e).8 Since there was nothing known about the
details of the interaction, Fermi had to start from scratch, with some, but not many
experimental constraints. He assumed that the interaction is pointlike and that the
interaction Hamiltonian is given by the product of the operators representing the
relevant particles multiplied by a coupling constant which has to be derived from
experiment. This coupling constant has the dimension energy−2.
With these assumptions and the application of perturbation theory, Fermi was
able to derive various mean lives of unstable nuclei as well as the shape of the electron
spectra. Fermi’s theory was highly successful and remained valid until experiments
established that parity is violated in weak interactions. In order to account for this,
Richard P. Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann (along with Robert E. Marshak and
E.C.G. Sudarshan) suggested in 1958 a modification of Fermi’s theory, the V − A
theory. This empirically very successful theory (apart from an explanation of CP
violation) is still based on a point interaction and uses the same coupling constant
Fermi used. Like Fermi’s theory, the V − A theory is not renormalisable.
2.1.3. Some conclusions
The theories of Fermi and Euler and Heisenberg have some interesting features. These
features are typical for EFTs and can be summarised as follows:
1. Both theories take only the relevant fields into account.
These fields, called effective fields, are the photon field (represented by the
electrical and magnetical field strengths) in the Euler–Heisenberg example, and
the proton, neutron, electron and neutrino fields in the Fermi theory of weak
interactions. Other fields, such as the electron field in the Euler–Heisenberg
case, do not show up explicitly at the respective energy scale. Their presence
is hidden, reflected by the non-linear terms in the effective Lagrangian density.
8Fermi took it to be a neutrino. He did not yet know about the conservation of lepton number
and other kinds of neutrinos.
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2. Both theories are valid only at a given energy scale.
The derivation of the Euler–Heisenberg theory presupposes that the photon
energy is small compared to the rest mass of the electron. Applications to
higher energies are not justified. The Fermi theory violates unitarity at high
energies (above 300 GeV) and is therefore also valid only at a specific energy
scale. For higher energies, alternative theories are needed.
3. Both theories are non-renormalisable.
It can be shown on general grounds that the theories by Euler and Heisenberg
and by Fermi are non-renormalisable. Divergent results show up once higher
order contributions to the perturbation expansion are calculated. To elimi-
nate them, a renormalisation scheme has to be specified. This renormalisation
scheme is therefore part of the definition of the EFT if one is interested in higher
order contributions.
4. Both theories are based on certain symmetries.
Symmetry requirements are very important in the construction process of an
EFT. This is demonstrated by our reconstruction of the development of the
Euler–Heisenberg theory; to get the effective Lagrangian density of Eqn (1), all
possible terms with the required symmetries have to be included—whether they
are renormalisable or not. The hard job is then to determine the coefficients of
the respective terms in the expansion.
Symmetry considerations also played a role in the formulation of the Fermi
theory. Since there was not much information about the structure of the weak
interaction, simplicity suggested a scalar interaction term. After the discovery
of the violation of parity conservation in the weak interactions, a combination
of all other possible types of Lorentz-invariant pointlike interactions were tried.
Fortunately, there are only five of them (scalar (S), pseudoscalar (P ), vector
(V ), axialvector (A) and tensor (T ) interactions) and a set of crucial experi-
ments finally selected the V − A of Feynman and Gell-Mann as the only one
compatible with available experimental data (see Franklin, 1990).
5. Both theories produce scientific understanding.
The work of Euler and Heisenberg had many motivations. Among those were
the wish to apply, to test, and to find out the consequences of Dirac’s provisional
quantum theory of fields. Another motive was to get a tractable mathematical
formalism which allowed the calculation of the interaction of photons at low
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energies. This goal suggested the chosen approximation scheme. Yet another
motive was to get some intuitive understanding of the respective processes.
This is directly substantiated by a section title in Euler’s original paper (1936,
p. 400; my translation):
§ 1. Provisional statement of an intuitive expression for the interaction U¯1 of
light with light [. . . ]
In the course of this work Euler mentions several times that his aim is to derive
an intuitive (anschaulich) expression which describes the physically relevant
processes. What does this mean? It was already well known at the time that
certain materials react in a non-linear way to external fields. The guiding idea
for Euler and Heisenberg now was that even the vacuum exhibits such non-
linear behaviour. Starting from the quantum theory of electrons and photons,
they succeeded in deriving non-linear corrections to Maxwell’s equations for
the vacuum based on this analogy. The corrections suggest the interpretation
that even the vacuum can be polarised, an effect which is responsible for the
non-vanishing photon-photon cross section. This analogy to an already well-
understood effect guided their derivation and helped to interpret the final result.
The resulting corrections to Maxwell’s equations are also very easy to handle
mathematically, once they are derived. It is a typical feature of EFTs that they
are very easy to handle (compared to the full theory), and also produce (local)
understanding (unlike the full theory, as I will argue below, see Section 3.1.1).
Pragmatic and cognitive goals meet here in an interesting way.
The Fermi theory produces understanding in so far as it is the simplest modifi-
cation of quantum electrodynamics which accounts for the phenomena of weak
interactions.
In the years between the development of Euler, Heisenberg and Fermi’s theories
and the late nineteen-forties, theoretical research in quantum field theory focused
mainly on formulating a theory which avoids the divergences in the perturbative ex-
pansion from which Dirac’s theory suffered. Satisfactory covariant renormalisation
schemes were finally introduced by Dyson, Feynman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga.9
Motivated by the astonishing success of QED, as manifested most convincingly in
the precise calculation of the Lamb shift and the anomalous magnetic moment of the
electron, renormalisability soon became the key criterion for the selection of quantum
9See Schweber (1994) for an historical account of these exciting developments.
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field theories for other phenomena (such as the weak and strong interactions). Hence-
forth, non-renormalisable theories had at best a provisional status: useful, perhaps,
for various calculations, but of no deeper significance. This view began to crumble
with the development of renormalization group techniques in the 1970s which finally
led to the rehabilitation of non-renormalisable theories and the establishment of the
research programme of EFTs. The next section will sketch this development in more
detail.
2.2. Renormalisation and the renormalisation group
The modern development of EFTs is closely related to a new conceptualisation of
renormalisation. This section will give a concise reconstruction of this development.
It all began with quantum electrodynamics (QED) and the supposed need to find a
way to eliminate the notorious infinities in the perturbation expansion. Let’s first
look at this expansion.
Let HI be the interaction Hamiltonian of a system and let Ψ(t) be a field operator
in the interaction picture. Ψ(t) satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation
HIΨ(t) = i
∂Ψ(t)
∂t
, (4)
which has the formal solution
Ψ(t) = Ψ(−∞)− i
∫ t
−∞
dt1 HI(t1) Ψ(t1) . (5)
In particle physics experiments, one is typically interested in the calculation of
scattering processes. This only requires information about the asymptotic state
Ψ(+∞) of the system under consideration. This state can be formally obtained
from the initial state by applying the so-called S-matrix:
Ψ(+∞) = S Ψ(−∞). (6)
If S is known, all relevant observables, such as scattering cross sections, can be
obtained easily. More explicitly, S is given by
S =
∞∑
n=0
(−i)n
n!
∫
d4x1 . . . d
4xn P {HI(x1) . . . HI(xn)} , (7)
with the time ordering operator P . Based on the last equation, a perturbation ex-
pansion can be derived which in turn can be translated into the language of Feynman
11
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Figure 2: The main contribution to the potential scattering of an electron.
diagrams. These diagrams provide an intuitive identification of all contributions to S
with a representation of elementary spacetime processes which lead from the initial
state to the final state while respecting all relevant conservation laws.
In quantum electrodynamics (QED), the theory we will focus on for a while, S can
be expanded in powers of the fine structure constant α0: S = S
(0) + S(1) + S(2) + . . .,
with S(n) being proportional to αn0 . Due to the smallness of α0 ≈ 1/137, a small
number of terms suffices to determine S with good accuracy.
But complications arise since divergences show up. Before pointing this out in
some detail, a change of notation will be useful: Since S = 1 describes the trivial
reaction that the finite state is identical to the initial state, it is useful to introduce
the so-called T -matrix which only captures non-trivial reactions: S = 1 + i T .
2.2.1. Renormalization in QED
To present the idea of renormalisation, let us focus on one specific process and let
us use the language of Feynman diagrams.10 The process we will focus on is the
scattering of an electron by an external potential Aext (cf. Fig. 2). The first diver-
gent term in the perturbation expansion of the S-matrix is depicted in Fig. 3. In
this diagram, a photon is emitted by the ‘incoming’ electron and reabsorbed by the
‘outgoing’ electron. This photon is called virtual because it does not show up in the
Feynman diagram as an external line with one loose end.
It is now interesting to ask what the energy and the momentum of this virtual
photon are. Although energy and momentum conservation hold at the vertices, this
10I am following the clear presentation given by Lepage (1989). See also Mills (1993).
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Figure 3: Vertex-correction to the potential scattering of an electron.
does not fix these values uniquely. A whole spectrum of values is possible, rang-
ing from zero to infinity. In the mathematical formalism this means that all those
contributions have to be added up, and here lies the source for the divergences.
In more technical terms, the story so far amounts to this: let k be the 4-momentum
of the virtual photon, and let p be the momentum of the incoming electron with bare
mass m0 and bare charge e0. 4-momentum conservation then requires that the mo-
mentum of the electron after the emission of the virtual photon is p − k. Similarly,
if p′ denotes the final electron 4-momentum, the 4-momentum of the electron imme-
diately after the interaction with the external potential is then p′ − k. 4-momentum
conservation does not give us any more information. k is completely undetermined
and all positive real numbers are possible for its absolute value. All resulting contri-
butions then have to be integrated up to get the T -matrix. Applying the Feynman
rules of QED, one obtains
T (a) = −e30
∫ ∞
0
d4k
(2π)4
1
k2
· u¯(p′)γ 1
(p′ − k) · γ −m0Aext(p
′−p) ·γ 1
(p− k) · γ −m0γu(p),
(8)
with spinors u(p) and u¯(p′) for the incoming and outgoing electron and the 4-vector
of Dirac’s γ-matrices denoted by γ. This integral is divergent since the numerator is
proportional to k3dk, while the denominator is proportional to k4 for large k: T (a)
diverges logarithmically. Many other divergent terms like this show up in higher
orders of the perturbation expansion, and many physicists came to the conclusion
that this is an indication of a serious inconsistency in the very foundations of the
theory.
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Pragmatically oriented as many physicists are, the empirical success of the renor-
malisation procedure developed around 1949 overruled these negative feelings. The
suggested renormalisation schemes were not only a way to eliminate the infinities;
they also led to new predictions and explanations of tiny corrections to observables.
These quantities (such as the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron or the
Lamb shift) have been measured in the laboratories with a remarkable accuracy. This
is generally considered as an impressive confirmation of QED and the renormalisation
scheme it applies. Let us see in some more detail how this works.
First, the divergent contributions have to be eliminated in all orders of pertur-
bation theory. It turned out that in QED these terms have the same structure as
terms which showed up already in the original Lagrangian density. Hence, they can
be eliminated by a suitable redefinition of the parameters of the original Lagrangian
density. These parameters are the mass and the charge of the electron:
m0 → mR = m0 + δm,
e0 → eR = e0 + δe. (9)
Here, mR is the renormalised mass and δm is the modification of the mass due to
higher order contributions to the perturbation theory. Simlilarly, eR is the renor-
malised charge and δe includes the radiative corrections.
Dyson showed that a reparametrisation of this kind can be carried through in all
orders of perturbation theory in QED.11 Now, while this procedure is so far purely
mathematical and might look like a trick, a physical interpretation is required to
justify this procedure. The basic idea behind this justification is to identify the
renormalised mass and charge of the electron with its ‘physical’ (i.e. real) mass and
charge. To get the observed finite values for these parameters, it has to be assumed
that the bare mass and charge of an electron are also infinite, cancelling the infinite
radiative corrections δm and δe. In the absence of the radiation field, the mass as
well as the charge of the electron would be infinite. It is the ‘switching-on’ of the
radiation field which accounts for the finite mass and charge of the electron.
At first sight it might sound problematic to attribute an infinite bare mass and
charge to the electron. Indeed, Richard Feynman meant exactly this when he claimed
that in QED the real problems are swept under the rug. For Feynman it does not help
to simply state that there is no real problem because a finite result can be obtained
by subtracting one infinite number (the calculated radiative correction) from another
infinite number (the—fortunately!—unobservable bare mass or charge).
11Later, Salam and Weinberg completed Dyson’s original proof; cf. Cao (1993, pp. 42f).
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But the situation is more subtle than this suggests. Let us go back to the example
of the electron interacting with an external potential. Eqn (8) represented the con-
tribution of the Feynman diagram from Fig. 3 to the scattering amplitude. Instead
of integrating over all k up to infinity, let us first introduce an upper limit Λ0 to this
integral. Doing so can be understood as a purely formal trick to keep the integral
well-defined and the numbers finite. The value of the original integral can then be
obtained by performing the limit Λ0 →∞ at the end of the calculation.
Next, let us go one step further. We consider another theory which has a cut-off
Λ < k < Λ0 and ask how the original theory with cut-off Λ0 has to be modified in
order to produce the same results as the theory with cut-off Λ. It turns out that the
following Lagrangian density has to be subtracted:
T (a)(k > Λ) = −e30
∫ Λ0
Λ
d4k
(2π)4
1
k2
·u¯(p′) γ 1
(p′ − k) · γ −m0 Aext(p
′−p)·γ 1
(p− k) · γ −m0γ u(p).
(10)
To proceed, let us assume that all masses and external momenta (p and p′) are
much smaller than Λ, so that the quantities m0, p and p
′ can be neglected in the
integrand. One obtains:
T (a)(k > Λ) ≈ −e30
∫ Λ0
Λ
d4k
(2π)4
1
k2
u¯(p′) γ
k · γ
k2
Aext(p
′ − p) · γ k · γ
k2
γu(p)
≈ −e30 u¯(p′) Aext(p′ − p) · γ u(p)
∫ Λ0
Λ
d4k
(2π)4
1
(k2)2
. (11)
In order to get the full T -matrix in this order of perturbation theory, other di-
agrams have to be included as well. Treating them in the same way as described
above, the following result obtains for that part of the scattering amplitude which
can be neglected due to the introduction of the new cutoff Λ:
T (k > Λ) ≈ −i e0 c0(λ/Λ0) u¯(p′) Aext(p′ − p) · γ u(p), (12)
with a dimensionless quantity c0, which only depends on the ratio Λ/Λ0:
c0(Λ/Λ0) = −α0
6π
log(Λ/Λ0). (13)
Note that Λ and Λ0 are the only energy scales at high energies for this problem since
p, p′ and m0 have been neglected.
Now T (k > Λ) is certainly an important contribution to the scattering amplitude
which cannot be ignored. However, it is possible to ‘simulate’ the contribution of this
term in the Lagrangian density with cut-off Λ by adding a counter term of the form:
δL0 = −e0 c0(Λ/Λ0) ψ¯ A · γ ψ. (14)
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Astonishingly, δL0 has the same structure as the current-field coupling term in the
original Lagrangian density of QED. The effect of the additional term can therefore
be included by a redefinition of the charge parameter: e0 → e0[1− c0(Λ/Λ0)].
To sum up: in a renormalisable quantum field theory such as QED, the contri-
butions of the high-energy sector of the theory can be effectively taken into account
by a reparametrisation of the original theory. As the above derivation shows, this
procedure does not presuppose that the original cut-off Λ0 goes to infinity. However,
if one calculates this limit one is bound to assume that the bare mass and charge are
indeed infinite in order to account for the finite values of various quantities which we
obtain in experiments.
A theory is called renormalisable if such an absorption of the divergent contri-
butions of the high-energy sector of the theory in the mass and charge parameter(s)
can be accomplished at all orders in perturbation theory. Doing so is, however, not
possible for all quantum field theories. In fact, only a very small subclass of all quan-
tum field theories is renormalisable. Motivated by the enormous empirical success
of QED, renormalisability soon became the selection criterion for the construction of
new quantum field theories. In his speech during the award of the Nobel price for
1979, Steven Weinberg argued this point:
To a remarkable degree, our present detailed theories of elementary par-
ticle interactions can be understood deductively, as consequences of sym-
metry principles and of the principle of renormalizablity which is invoked
to deal with the infinities (Weinberg, 1980a, p. 515).
Somewhat later in this speech, Weinberg addressed the issue of the role of renormal-
isability for his own work:
I learned about renormalization as a graduate student, mostly by reading
Dyson’s papers. From the beginning it seemed to me to be a wonderful
thing that very few quantum field theories are renormalizable. Limitations
of this sort are, after all what we most want; not mathematical methods
which can make sense out of an infinite variety of physically irrelevant
theories, but methods which carry constraints, because constraints can
point the way towards the one true theory [. . .. At the time] I thought that
renormalizability might be the key criterion, which also in a more general
context would impose a precise kind of simplicity on our theories and
help us pick out the one true physical theory out of the infinite variety of
conceivable quantum theories [. . .]. I would say this a bit differently today,
but I am more convinced than ever that the use of renormalizability as a
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constraint on our theories of the observed interactions is a good strategy
(Weinberg, 1980a, p. 517).
Renormalisation started as a pragmatic scheme which allowed efficient and precise
predictions but which was theoretically considered to be unsatisfying and perhaps
only provisional. It soon became the selection criterion (besides symmetry princi-
ples) for future quantum field theories. The theories found in this way (such as the
Standard Model) turned out to be highly successful. The subsequent developments,
summarised in the next section, led to a rehabilitation of non-renormalisable theo-
ries. Renormalisation is not any longer considered to be a decisive criterion for theory
choice, but one should not forget to address the issue why renormalisable theories
such as the Standard Model are so successful. We shall come back to this below.
2.2.2. A new conceptualisation of renormalisation
Let us summarise the renormalisation story told so far: In a renormalisable theory,
the divergent terms in the perturbation can be eliminated by redefining the param-
eters of the original theory. The standard reasoning for this is that the bare masses
and charges of the particles involved are not observable because of the ineliminable
presence of radiation fields. These parameters can therefore be chosen freely, e.g. one
can choose them to be infinite. The observed values of the masses and charges are
then due to compensation effects of the radiative corrections.
This story did not convince everyone. One of the most severe critics was Paul
Dirac, the founder of the old quantum theory of fields in which the problem with
infinities first occurred. Several year later he wrote:
This [i. e. the renormalisation programme] is quite nonsense physically,
and I have always been opposed to it. It is just a rule of thumb that gives
results (Dirac, 1983, p. 55).12
However amazed by the empirical success of the renormalisation machinery and
the possibilities it opened up of constructing new theories such as the Standard
Model, most physicists did not follow Dirac’s skepticism. Those who did, such as
the advocates of the programme of Axiomatic QFT, did not succeed in finding the
supposed inconsistency in the foundations of the theory.13 The historical development
took a different path. The key to make sense of renormalisation came from within
physics and the guiding idea was to interpret realistically the cut-off parameter which
12See also Kragh (1990, pp. 165f).
13Cf. Wightman (1986) for a discussion of renormalisation in this programme. See also Cao (1997,
pp. 217–219).
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showed up in renormalisation schemes. It represents the energy scale up to which the
theory in question is applicable.
To see this, let us go back to our example. It turned out to be helpful to replace
the upper limit of the integral by some cut-off Λ. The standard procedure, first
suggested by Feynman, is to take the limit and let Λ go to infinity at the end of
the calculation. For Feynman, the cut-off was a purely formal calculational device
(‘formal interpretation’), and indeed there was a good reason for this, since a realistic
interpretation of the cut-off leads immediately to a new problem.
In this case, photons with all energies contribute, for example, to the diagram
of Fig. 3. Now, photons and electrons are not the only particles present at high
energies. And these other particles (such as protons, muons and pions) also couple
to the electron and the photon. If one interprets the cut-off parameter realistically,
there is no reason why these particles and their interactions should not be included
in the calculation. But in that case, maybe it is just these contributions that make
the theory finite. According to the realistic interpretation of the cut-off (if taken in
the limit Λ →∞), only the final theory, if there is any, should be finite. So there is
no reason anymore why QED with photons and electrons should be renormalisable.
But there is another way to interpret this situation. One can say that there
is no reason anymore to consider theories with a finite cut-off as second rank if
the cut-off parameter is interpreted realistically. This parameter then just reflects
the production threshold of new particles (muons, pions, etc.) and the theory is
henceforth only applicable up to this energy. A realistic interpretation of the cut-off
leads to a rehabilitation of theories with a finite cut-off.
The formalism sketched so far can be easily extended to solve the following prob-
lem: given a theory with cut-off Λ1, how can we get from there to a theory with a
higher cut-off Λ2? If no new particles show up in the energy regime between Λ1 and
Λ2, it turns out that only the parameters of the theory (masses, charges) have to be
changed (‘renormalised’). Consequently, the masses and charges of particles depend
on the energy scale under consideration; they have no absolute values. To get the
values of these parameters on a higher or lower scale, the so-called renormalisation
group equations have to be solved14.
Let us again illustrate this with our example from QED. As we saw, the elimi-
nation of states above some energy Λ0 < Λ (with Λ being the cut-off of the original
theory) can be obtained by adding additional local terms of the form
δL = −e0c0( Λ
Λ0
) ψ¯ γµA
µ ψ −m0c˜0( Λ
Λ0
) ψ¯ ψ, (15)
14See Fischer (1999) for a general introduction.
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with dimensionless parameters c0 und c˜0 proportional to ln Λ/Λ0. The new La-
grangian density is then
L′ = LQED + δL = ψ¯(iγµ∂µ − eΛγµAµ −mΛ)ψ, (16)
with the renormalised charge and mass given by
eΛ = e0
[
1 + c0(
Λ
Λ0
)
]
,
mΛ = m0
[
1 + c˜0(
Λ
Λ0
)
]
. (17)
Changing the cut-off can therefore be compensated by changing the parameters
of the theory. It can be shown that the parameters obey the renormalisation group
equations:
Λ
deΛ
dΛ
= β(eΛ)
Λ
dmΛ
dΛ
= mΛγ(eΛ), (18)
with appropriate functions β and γ.
These equations grew out of the research of Michael Fisher, Leo Kadanoff and
most importantly Kenneth Wilson in the context of solid state physics. It happened
to have fruitful applications in particle physics as well. Here is the upshot of all this:
(1) interpreting the cut-off realistically leads to a reappraisal of theories with a finite
cut-off. (2) There is a systematic algorithm as to how to change the parameters of
a theory when the energy scale is changed. (3) This algorithm, introduced here only
for the case of a specific renormalisable theory, can be extended to other quantum
field theories, including non-renormalisable quantum field theories, and to applica-
tions where new particles show up in the energy regime between the two cut-offs.
2.2.3. The decoupling theorem
Only one more idea is missing to make EFTs a powerful tool: the decoupling theo-
rem, proved by Appelquist and Carazzone in 1975. In its simplest case, this theorem
demonstrates that for two coupled systems with different energy scales m1 and m2
(with m2 > m1) and described by a renormalisable theory, there is always a renor-
malisation condition according to which the effects of the physics at scale m2 can be
effectively included in the theory with the smaller scale m1 by changing the param-
eters of the corresponding theory. The decoupling theorem implies the existence of
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an EFT at scale m1 which will, however, cease to be applicable once the energy gets
close to m2.
One might think that this is not such a spectacular result since the whole edifice
of physics is grounded on the assumption that empirical reality is layered so that
for the physics at a given energy scale the details of the physics at much higher
energies do not really matter. The idea of eliminating the physics at higher energies
to get an effective account that is valid only at lower energies is also quite popular
in other parts of physics. In his beautiful book Qualitative Methods in Quantum
Theory, Migdal (1977) discusses an instructive example from quantum mechanics.
Let S be a system which is composed of a fast subsystem Sf and a slow subsystem
Ss, characterised by two frequencies ωf and ωs. It can be shown that the effects of Sf
on Ss can be taken into account effectively by adding a potential energy term to the
Hamiltonian operator of Ss. In this case, as well as in many other cases, one ends up
with an effective Hamiltonian operator for the subsystem characterised by the smaller
frequency (or energy). It is interesting, however, that the decoupling theorem holds,
given certain assumptions, also in quantum field theory. This is far from trivial if
one recalls all those complicated radiative corrections which have to be taken into
account here.
The decoupling theorem gives further legitimacy to non-renormalisable theories.
If that theorem holds, the physics at higher energies can be effectively included in
the parameters of a non-renormalisable EFT. Higher energy scales decouple and em-
pirical reality seems to be divided into a set of ‘quasi-autonomous domains’, each
theoretically captured by an EFT which employs only those particles and their in-
teractions that are relevant at that scale. The domains are only quasi-autonomous
since the effects of the physics at higher energy scales get more important once the
energy reaches the cut-off energy of the EFT under consideration. It should be noted
that EFTs can also be divined or obtained if one is not in the possession of a funda-
mental and renormalisable theory such as QED. It might, however, be more difficult
to ‘anchor’ these theories, as the example of Fermi’s theory showed. In these cases,
finding a suitable EFT is more like guessing.
Does the decoupling theorem imply that empirical reality is, as a whole, layered
into quasi-autonomous domains, as suggested by some authors? No, since the de-
coupling theorem is based on assumptions which may not always be fulfilled. Most
importantly, the decoupling theorem (as proved by Appelquist and Carazzone) pre-
supposes that there is a renormalisable theory of the composite system which is the
starting point of the decoupling procedure. Without such a theory, which is sup-
posed to be valid on all energy scales, the decoupling theorem cannot be applied.
Furthermore, the decoupling theorem presupposes that different mass scales exist in
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the underlying renormalisable theory. But sometimes mass scales do not separate
neatly, as examples from the theory of complex systems (such as turbulence) demon-
strate. In these cases the physics at high energies cannot simply be absorbed in the
parameters of a low-energy theory and the picture of empirical reality as layered into
a hierachy of quasi-autonomous domains turns out to be too wild an extrapolation.
2.3. Two ways to apply EFTs
There are two ways to use EFTs in physics, the bottom-up approach and the top-down
approach. I will describe both of them in some detail.
2.3.1. The bottom-up approach
This strategy is closely related to observable phenomena and some think that this is
the way physics has to proceed. We will look at these arguments below (Section 4.2).
To apply this strategy, two scenarios have to be distinguished. First, there might
be no relevant theory at all. In this case one has to start from scratch and construct
a Lagrangian density from the particles, symmetries and interactions assumed to
be relevant at the energy scale under consideration. Second, there is already some
EFT T1 which represents the physics at some energy scale, characterised by a cut-off
parameter Λ1. This theory might be, for example, QED or the Standard Model, both
of which are—despite being renormalisable—considered to be EFTs. They might be
applicable only up to some maximal energy Λ1. At higher energies, new phenomena
might happen to show up, and T1 does not account for them. In order to obtain a
new theory T2 (valid up to some energy Λ2 > Λ1) from the old theory T1, two more
cases have to be distinguished:
1. There are no new particles between Λ1 and Λ2.
In this case all the parameters of T1 (i.e. charges and masses) have to be
modified according to the renormalisation group equations. If the energy is less
than Λ1, both theories will give the same results for observable phenomena.
But T2 can also be applied for the energy range between Λ1 and Λ2. It should
be noted that the relation between T1 and T2 for energies up to Λ1 is very
interesting. On the one hand, the theories differ from each other because their
respective mass and charge parameters have different numerical values, while
on the other hand, both are empirically equivalent.
Even if there are no new particles in the energy regime between Λ1 and Λ2,
new interactions between the old particles might become important. T2 is then
constructed by including these new interactions in the Lagrangian density of
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T1. In order to save the phenomena accounted for already by T1, some of the
parameters of T1 might have to be changed and new parameters have to be
adjusted appropriately.
2. There are new particles between Λ1 and Λ2.
This case is, of course, the more complicated one. T2 is now constructed in sev-
eral steps. First, the masses and charges of T1 have to be adapted to the new
energy scale; again, this is done by solving the renormalisation group equations.
Second, all new particles which show up in the energy regime between Λ1 and
Λ2 have to be identified. Are they fermions or bosons? What is their mass and
charge (on the scale Λ2)? How do they couple to the other particles? The for-
malism of quantum field theory presents a tool box to systematically construct
the new terms in the Lagrangian density of T2. In many cases, the relevant
coupling constants have to be adjusted to experimental results. This procedure
therefore has a theoretical (or a priori, if you like) and an experimental (or a
posteriori) component. The structure of the new terms follows from the general
formalism of quantum field theory. The masses, charges and coupling constants
have to be determined on the basis of experiments. This procedure is, of course,
not completely theory-free. The determination of the relevant parameters takes
place on a given energy scale, and auxilliary (or measurement) theories have to
be used to determine their numerical values. These measurement theories also
work on a given energy scale, and consistency must be achieved in this whole
process.
There are several examples for the bottom-up approach in physics. The Fermi
theory of weak interactions, discussed in Section 2.1.2, is a good example of a theory
which had to start from scratch. Doing so, one might be mistaken, for example, when
it comes to specifying the correct interaction between the relevant particles, as the
discovery of parity violation for weak interactions shows. The work based on taking
the general theory of relativity as an EFT is a good example of case 1 mentioned
above. Here new interactions are included which correct Einstein’s theory at higher
energies. The new theories obtained by following this approach have been interpreted
tentatively as low-energy limits of a quantum theory of gravity. We do not know this
theory yet, but following the EFT approach might eventually lead to new ideas as
to what such a theory might look like (Donoghue, 1994a,b). The problem here is of
course that there are almost no experimental data available which can be used to fix
the parameters in the new theory (as in the case of Fermi’s theory). It might, how-
ever, be possible to derive these parameters from candidate theories for a quantum
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theory of gravity. Supersymmetric extensions of the Standard Model are an example
of case 2. Here the Standard Model is essentially duplicated by including the super-
symmetric partners of all particles which are already present in the Standard Model
(Meissner, 1992). Again, the problem here is that there are no experimental data yet
that can be used to fix the new parameters (such as the masses of the supersymmetric
partners of the leptons and quarks).
2.3.2. The top-down approach
This strategy starts with a more fundamental theory which is vaild on a given energy
scale Λ1. The aim is now to construct an EFT for lower energies Λ2 < Λ1. There
is a systematic procedure for getting these low-energy theories. Once the original
theory is renormalisable and the decoupling theorem holds, a tower of EFTs can be
uncovered in this way. A typical example of this strategy is the theory of Euler and
Heisenberg, discussed in Section 2.1.1. Here, a purely photonic theory was obtained
from QED by eliminating all electronic degrees of freedom. The resulting EFT is
then valid for photons whose energy is much smaller than the rest mass of the elec-
tron. Other examples of this strategy are the various attempts to justify some kind
of superstring theory. These theories cannot be tested experimentally at a typical
energy of a superstring. Instead, systematic low energy expansions are carried out in
order to obtain low-energy footprints of the high energy regime of this theory. Yet
another example of the application of the top-down strategy is provided by nuclear
and particle physics. I will look at this case in some more detail in the next section.
3 Theorising in Nuclear and Particle Physics: A
Case Study
The present situation in theoretical nuclear and particle physics is rather involved.
On the one hand, there is the Standard Model, a renormalisable and well-confirmed
theory which should, in principle, account for all phenomena which are not gravita-
tional. On the other hand, there are all sorts of models and EFTs which are often
used in practical applications. Especially in the sector of the Standard Model which
deals with strong interactions, a plurality of theoretical accounts can be identified.
They all seem to coexist peacefully, and they all seem to complement each other in a
way which I will investigate in more detail below. In this section, I shall focus on the
physics of the strong interaction only and first introduce quantum chromodynamics,
the underlying theory, as well as some typical models and EFTs in this part of physics
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(Section 3.1). By focusing on their respective functions in the research process, Sec-
tion 3.2 argues that all of them are indispensable and Section 3.3 points out various
interrelations between them. This case study will be the basis of my argument for
some variant of pluralism in the next section.
3.1. Theories, models and EFTs
For a long time, the physics of strong interactions lacked a fundamental theory. There
were phenomenological models, all of which could be applied for some purposes, but
all of which had their well-known limits. Among the models used extensively in
nuclear physics are the liquid drop model and the nuclear shell model. The liquid
drop model helps to understand nuclear fission, as Niels Bohr and John A. Wheeler
pointed out, but fails to explain why certain configurations of protons and neutrons
are particularly stable. These ‘magic numbers’ of protons and neutrons can be nat-
urally explained with the nuclear shell model which has, in turn, other deficiencies.
Among the models of the constituents of the nuclei (protons, neutrons and pions)
are various bag models, chiral quark models, the purely bosonic Skyrme model, and
approaches which utilise sum rules derived in the spirit of the S-matrix tradition.
All these models were considered provisional at best, and applied and studied
because of a lack of a more satisfactory alternative. Fortunately, this alternative was
found in the early nineteen-seventies.15 Quantum chromodynamics (QCD) was born,
but it soon turned out that tractable applications of this theory could only be ob-
tained in the high-energy regime. Nuclear physics and the theory of hadron structure
remained almost completely unaffected and developed quite independently for a long
time. There have been some attempts to derive low-energy results from QCD, but
these endeavours turned out to be technically extremely hard and rather uninterest-
ing and unilluminating. Other QCD-inspired research in hadron physics involved the
qualitative modelling of features of QCD such as confinement and dynamical chiral
symmetry breaking. These models (see Section 3.1.2) have been quite successful, but
their formal relation to QCD is far from clear. This is where EFTs come in handy.
EFTs allow a systematic low-energy expansion of QCD, and many of the old models
could be given a more solid foundation.
3.1.1. The theory: quantum chromodynamics
QCD is generally considered to be the fundamental theory of strong interactions.
15For a reconstruction of this development and for an analysis of the role models played in this
context see Hartmann (1995a,b).
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It is a renormalisable gauge theory, and its fundamental entities are the fermionic
quarks (spin-1/2) and the bosonic gluons (spin-1). There are six different kinds of
quarks (‘flavours’): up, down, strange, charm, bottom and the recently discovered
top. Besides spin and flavour, quarks have an additional degree of freedom which is
called ‘colour’. Gluons, the exchange particles of the strong interactions, show up in
eight different kinds and, unlike photons in QED, directly interact with each other.
This fact, which is a consequence of the internal colour structure of the gluons, along
with the large value for the coupling constant of QCD, makes actual calculations very
complicated and involved. The self-interaction of the gluons follows mathematically
from the non-commutativity of the generators of the corresponding gauge group,
colour-SU(3). Here is the Lagrangian density of QCD:
LQCD = ψ¯(iγµDµ − mˆ0)ψ − 1
4
FkµνF
µν
k . (19)
ψ represents the quark field and F µνk (with k = 1, . . . , 8 for the eight gauge degrees
of freedom) is the field strength tensor associated with the gluons. The operator Dµ
fixes the gauge invariant coupling of the quarks and the gluons and mˆ0 is the mass
matrix of the quarks; the quarks which show up in the Lagrangian density of QCD
are also called ‘current quarks’, as opposed to the much heavier ‘constituent quarks’
of non-relativistic quark models. This matrix cannot be deduced from first principles
and has to be adjusted to experimental data.
For most low-energy applications, exact consequences of Eqn (19) can only be
obtained numerically with a method called lattice gauge theory (see Montvay and
Mu¨nster, 1994). Here quark and gluon fields are defined on a lattice with a finite
spacing a; exact results can be obtained by running extensive computer simulations
with finite a and extrapolating the results to the continuum limit a → 0. Although
this method also suffers from technical problems, my main point about lattice gauge
theory is that it effectively works like a black box. Technical problems aside, lattice
gauge theory produces the exact results of QCD and hence makes tests of this theory
possible. However, it does not reveal more about the concrete mechanisms which
account for the calculated result. Like a black-box theory, lattice gauge theory yields
consequences of a theory, but it does not produce insight and understanding.16
This account of ‘black-boxism’ does not square with traditional black-box the-
ories such as behaviourism. These theories were criticised for not providing a de-
tailed mechanism for the dynamics of a system. According to Bunge (1964), these
16This point is elaborated in Hartmann (1999).
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mechanisms have to be provided by a fundamental theory.17 In the case of strong
interactions, QCD does indeed specify the overall dynamics of the system; there are
quarks and gluons, and these entities interact in a very complicated way with each
other according to the Lagrangian density of QCD. But not much more can be said:
the rest has to be done numerically with the help of high-powered computers (cf.
Lepage (1994)). And computers function like a black box. All possible Feynman di-
agrams are summarised, although, perhaps, only a few of them (or a certain subclass
of them) produce almost the whole effect under investigation. A knowledge of these
actually relevant processes would produce insight and understanding. Lattice gauge
theory does not produce this insight, and QCD is, therefore, effectively a black-box
theory.
In order to learn something about the actually relevant processes, models and
EFTs are applied. While EFTs can be directly obtained from QCD by following
well-defined procedures, models usually extract one or more of the general features
and consequences of the theory and explore their implications. Some of these general
features and consequences are well known. Among them are the following three
(Donoghue et al., 1992).
First, QCD is asymptotically free. This means that quarks move freely at very
high energies. At low energies (energies of the order of the rest mass of the proton),
the reverse effect shows up and quarks and gluons interact very strongly with each
other. This is why perturbation theory, which works so well in QED, cannot be
applied here.
Second, QCD exhibits quark confinement. First introduced to account for the fact
that no one ever observed a free quark, it now seems clear that quark confinement
is a strict consequence of QCD. But what does confinement really amount to? This
is not so clear and there are several options to be found in the literature. Some
argue that the interaction between the quarks increases with their distance, others
favor a model according to which quarks are bound inside some solid sphere which
prevents the existence of free quarks. And there are other, more technical proposals
(for details see Hartmann (1999)).
Third, low energy QCD is (almost) chirally invariant and exhibits dynamical chiral
symmetry breaking. Unlike confinement, this phenomenon is well understood. Here is
the basic idea. The masses of the quarks in the Lagrangian density of QCD (see Eqn
(19)) are very small (about 10 MeV) compared to the typical energy scale of strong
interactions (about 1 GeV). Let us therefore assume that quarks are massless. The
17For an interesting discussion of the role of phenomenological theories in physics see also Heisen-
berg (1966).
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Lagrangian density of QCD then exhibits another symmetry, called chiral symmetry.
As a consequence of this symmetry, so-called left-handed and right-handed eigenstates
of the QCD Hamiltonian cannot be distinguished energetically. Every hadron which
is an eigenstate of the QCD Hamiltonian should have a chiral partner with the same
mass, but with opposite chirality. Now, these chiral partners do not seem to exist.
There is, for example, no other particle with the mass and charge of the proton,
but with opposite chirality.18 A way out of this difficulty is to assume that chiral
symmetry is dynamically broken. This means that the interaction itself breaks the
symmetry so that a large mass gap between the chiral partners emerges. The pion
emerges as the corresponding Goldstone boson of the broken symmetry. It should
be noted, however, that chiral symmetry is also explicitly broken due to the non-
vanishing of the values of the current quark masses in the Lagrangian density of
QCD. This effect has some interesting consequences, such as the finite pion mass.
3.1.2. Models
I take a model to be a set of assumptions (added, perhaps, by diagrams, sketches, and
other visualisations), where some of these assumptions might be inspired by a theory.
All other assumptions specify the concrete object or system under consideration.
Phenomenological models, like the ones in hadron physics, use theories like a tool
box; they pick some of the relevant features of (at least) one theory, fit these into
a larger theoretical framework (which might be different from the one employed by
the theory), and explore the consequences of the assumptions made. This procedure
allows for models to be used as probes for the features of the underlying theory
(Hartmann, 1999). The deductive relation between a model and an underlying theory
is, however, not at all clear.
Among the relevant features of QCD at low energies are quark confinement and
the dynamical breaking of chiral symmetry. While bag models concentrate on the first
feature, chiral quark models explore the consequences of QCD’s second main feature.
The first and conceptually easiest bag model is the MIT-Bag Model (see Mosel, 1999,
Ch. 16). Here quark confinement is included in the model assumptions by restricting
the motion of quarks to a finite region in space, the ‘bag’. Mathematically this is done
by imposing an appropriate boundary condition to the quark wavefunctions which
are assumed to be a solution of the (free) Dirac equation for relativistic particles.
Bag models like the MIT-Bag Model therefore do not operate in the framework of
quantum field theory (such as QCD), but in the framework of relativistic quantum
mechanics which is mathematically easier to handle.
18The chirality is given by the projection of the spin on the momentum of the particle.
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Chiral models explore the consequences of chiral symmetry and its dynamical
breaking. Some of these models take only quark degrees of freedom into account
(such as the Nambu–Jona–Lasinio model), others (such as the Skyrme model) neglect
quark degrees of freedom completely and describe hadrons in terms of scalar and
pseudoscalar meson fields, while yet other models favour an hybrid account of quark
and meson degrees of freedom (such as the soliton models of the Friedberg-Lee type)
(see Mosel, 1999, Ch. 17). These models have a long history which started in the days
of the S-matrix programme and the work on current algebra in the nineteen-fifties
and sixties. In this context, plenty of experimentally well-confirmed relations between
hadron masses have been derived from the assumption of chiral symmetry only. A
famous example is the Gell-Mann–Oakes–Renner relation which relates properties of
the pion (its mass mπ and its decay constant fπ) to quark properties:
m2πf
2
π = −
mu +md
2
< q¯q >, (20)
where < q¯q >≈ (−250 MeV)3 is the so-called quark condensate.
3.1.3. Effective field theories
The most popular EFT based on QCD is Chiral Perturbation Theory, developed by
Steven Weinberg, Heinrich Leutwyler and others in the nineteen-eighties. I will give
a short outline of this approach along the lines of Leutwyler (1994).
The main idea of Chiral Perturbation Theory is to expand the Lagrangian density
of QCD in terms of a typical momentum for the process under consideration. For the
sake of simplicity let us assume for a moment that the current quark masses vanish
(mu = md = 0) and that there are only two quark flavours. This last assumption is
reasonable in the low-energy regime of about 1 GeV.
In order to get the desired momentum expansion, one first replaces the quark
and gluon fields of QCD by a set of pion fields which are, as pointed out above, the
Goldstone bosons of the theory due to the dynamical breaking of chiral symmetry.
These fields can be conveniently represented by a 2× 2 matrix U(x) ∈ SU(2). Next,
the Lagrangian density of QCD is expressed exclusively in terms of U(x). After this
decisive step in the derivation, quark and gluon degrees of freedom do not show up
in the Lagrangian density anymore. One obtains:
LQCD = Leff (U, ∂U, ∂2U, . . .). (21)
It turns out that a low energy expansion of this Lagrangian density can be obtained
by expanding LQCD in terms of the derivatives of U(x).19 The Lorentz invariance
19This follows from the observation that the momentum operator is given by pµ = −i∂µ.
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of the whole Lagrangian density implies that only terms with an even number of
derivatives show up in the truncated expression. One obtains:
L = L2eff + L4eff + L6eff + . . . (22)
The requirement of chiral symmetry very much constrains the form of the terms
in this expansion. The second-order contribution is given by:
L2eff =
1
4
F 2π tr[∂µU
†∂µU ]. (23)
This term is essentially determined by the decay constant of the pion (Fπ). The next
term of order p4 is already a bit more complicated:
L4eff =
1
4
l1 (tr[∂µU
†∂µU ])2 +
1
4
l2 tr[∂µU
†∂νU ] tr[∂µU †∂νU ]. (24)
It turns out that these first two terms suffice already for many practical applications.
Why is this procedure called ’Chiral Perturbation Theory’? The reason is this:
we have, so far, assumed that the quark masses vanish and that chiral symmetry is
hence an exact symmetry of QCD. This is an approximation since chiral symmetry
is explicitly broken due to the finite (though small) current masses of the quarks.
These effects are taken into account in another perturbation expansion in the quark
masses.
The whole procedure of Chiral Perturbation Theory therefore consists of two
power series expansions, one in some typical momentum, and the other in the mass
matrix m = diag(mu,md) of the quarks. In order to be consistent, one contribution of
a quark mass term in the expansion must correspond to two powers of the momentum.
In leading (i.e. second) order one obtains:
L2eff =
1
4
F 2π tr[∂µU
†∂µU ] +
1
2
F 2π tr[m(U + U
†)]. (25)
It is interesting to note that many of the phenomenological models and current
algebra relations (low-energy theorems) derived in the nineteen-sixties and seventies
can be strictly deduced from QCD and summarised in a compact fashion (cf. Ecker,
1995).
While the original programme of Chiral Perturbation Theory only aimed at ap-
plications in hadron physics, the more complicated task of deriving EFTs for nuclear
physics from QCD has also been undertaken. This remarkably popular and successful
research programme is reviewed by Van Kolck (1999). It demonstrates how the rela-
tion between theories of several domains (nuclei—protons, neutrons, and pions—and
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quarks) can be studied in a mathematically controlled way. This fact has implications
for the reductionism debate, which will be discussed in Section 4.2.
3.2. Functions of theories, models and EFTs
Theories, models, and EFTs have various functions in actual scientific practice. They
are more or less efficient tools in the process of theorising, helping scientists to reach
certain cognitive goals. It turns out that none of these tools serves all the functions
scientists are interested in. Consequently, a suitable combination of them has to be
applied. We will come back to this in Section 4.1.
3.2.1. The functions of theories
Theories have a wide scope of applicability. QCD, for example, should apply to all
phenomena governed by strong interactions. It should not only account for the prop-
erties of protons and neutrons, but also for whole nuclei and their interactions as
well as for astrophysical objects such as neutron stars. Theories provide a coherent
account of a large class of phenomena: they unify phenomena which, at first sight,
do not have much to do with each other. When it comes to calculations, theories
(such as QCD) give the most precise values for the quantities in question. They are
therefore also good tools to predict new effects. Theories constrain the assumptions
made in models, and may also suggest models (such as the hadron models mentioned
above).
However, the price for universal scope and predictive accuracy is that the theory
does not provide local understanding of the relevant physical processes. Usually, the
theory can only be solved numerically and the entities employed by it, such as quarks
and gluons, are ‘too far away’ from the phenomena in question. An understanding of
why neutron stars eventually collapse, for example, is hardly achieved by referring to
the dynamics of the myriads of quarks and gluons which supposedly constitute these
astrophysical objects. Theories produce global understanding by fitting an object or
system under consideration into a bigger framework, but tend to fall short in their
efforts to produce local understanding (see also Section 4.3).
3.2.2. The functions of models
Models, on the other hand, produce local understanding. They often go with a causal-
mechanistic story and aim at capturing the essential physics of a phenomenon in a few
assumptions (with only a few parameters), just as a caricature represents a person
with a few brush lines. As a consequence of this, models are easy to handle mathe-
matically (compared to a more fundamental theory), and deductive consequences of
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the model can be obtained in an efficient manner. This pragmatic (or computational)
superiority of models to theories can hardly be over-estimated (see Humphreys, 1994,
1995). Models are also heuristically very important; they often play a decisive role in
the construction of more fundamental theories (such as QCD, as I showed in detail in
Hartmann (1995a,b)) or suggest strategies to derive EFTs from a more fundamental
theory.20
Among the drawbacks of models are the following. The assumptions made by
models often lack a deeper foundation; sometimes they are just ad hoc in order to
save a phenomenon. As the case study has shown, there might not be a ‘controlled’
deductive relation between the model and an underlying theory, and if a derivation of
the model from the theory is actually carried through, further assumptions have to be
made to obtain the model, and these assumptions (which might turn out to be more
dubious than the assumptions made by the original model) again require a justifica-
tion, and so on, ad infinitum. The parameters which enter a model are sometimes
derived from the theory; often, however, they are simply adjusted to experimental
results. So they often require a deeper theoretical underpinning. Assumptions made
by models might contradict assumptions made by other models, or by a theory for
that matter. The MIT-Bag Model, for example, violates chiral symmetry, and many
chiral quark models lack confinement. And yet, as I have argued in Hartmann (1999),
the models and the underlying theory are bound together in some sense. There of-
ten is a story which connects the vocabulary of the model to the vocabulary of the
underlying theory even if there are no formalised ontological bridges in the sense of
Rohrlich (2000). We shall come back to this in Section 4.1.
3.2.3. The functions of EFTs
EFTs share many of the functions of theories and models. Like models, they provide
a local, intuitive account of a given phenomenon in terms of the degrees of freedom
which are relevant at the energy scale under consideration. They are relatively easy
to solve and to apply, and they are heuristically useful. This is demonstrated by the
Fermi theory and the V − A theory which eventually led to the Standard Model, as
well as by the EFTs which are used to test the low-energy regime of a future quantum
theory of gravity. Like theories, EFTs are part of a bigger picture or framework, from
which they can be derived in a controlled way. They help to make predictions and to
test the theory they relate to. EFTs avoid the disadvantage of theories of being ‘too
far away’ from the phenomena.
In practice, however, EFTs often contain more adjustable parameters than a
20A more complete list of the various functions of models can be found in Hartmann (1999).
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model of the same system. Besides, EFTs are only applicable if the energy scales
of a system separate well. That is why EFTs work well in particle physics, but do
not work so well in the physics of complex systems. Here models and perhaps more
fundamental theories are required. It should also be noted that EFTs are closely
related to the general framework of QFT. If this framework theory breaks down at
some energy and, say, a superstring theory takes over, the whole idea of EFTs might
also be vitiated. Then it would have to be clarified in which sense the old EFTs can
be recovered or obtained within a certain limit from the new theory.
3.3. Relations between theories, models and EFTs
The theories, models, and EFTs discussed in this section are intimately related to
each other. There are various interactions and dependencies as well as conceptual and
cognitive relations between these tools which I will now point out by going through
the material presented in the case study above.
Theories and models are often not related deductively. However, theories may
inspire models which pick out a feature of a more fundamental theory, such as con-
finement or chiral symmetry in the case of QCD, and embed it in a less complex
theoretical framework (such as non-relativistic quantum mechanics). By doing so,
models function as a probe to explore the consequences of just one aspect of the
theory. This leads to a better understanding of the physics represented by the the-
ory. Theories may also be used to fix the numerical value of the parameters of a
model. Many quark models, for example, employ the strong coupling constant which
is taken from QCD. Other models have adjustable parameters which can be calcu-
lated directely from the underlying theory (although this is often not done in order to
have more freedom to adjust the model to experimental data). Models, on the other
hand, often play a role in the construction process of a theory (as the QCD-example
demonstrates).
Models and EFTs are not always easy to distinguish. Sometimes, a newly devel-
oped EFT or some consequence of it turns out to be identical to a model developed
many years earlier. An example of this is the work on current algebra. Many of the
results which were derived in this framework since the nineteen-sixties turn out to
be consequences of chiral perturbation theory. The EFT then provides additional
support for the model. Some EFTs are treated like models because no attempt has
been made to calculate, for example, the coupling constants and renormalised masses
from first principles. They are simply fitted to experimental data. In some cases,
models are employed to obtain these parameters.
EFTs and theories may be related in a deductive sense, provided that there is
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a theory. EFTs then serve to apply and test the theory because they are easier to
handle mathematically. They point out the relevant mechanisms at a given energy
scale, which helps to better understand the physics covered by the theory. If there is
no theory, following the bottom-up strategy of constructing a tower of EFTs might
eventually give scientists a hint as to where to look for a more fundamental theory.
But of course, there is no direct way from, say, QED to quarks; just using the tricks
of the renormalisation group will not take you from here to there. This is where
creativity and imagination comes in.
Most important are the cases where theories, models and EFTs complement each
other. The establishment of dynamical chiral symmetry breaking as a feature of
QCD, for example, resulted from the interaction of all three approaches. Lattice
gauge calculations suggested models, consequences of models were used to derive an
EFT, which in turn inspired other models and allowed for analytical results. It is
this interaction between various tools that makes scientific research so exciting.
4 Some Philosophical Lessons
I will now draw some more general conclusions from this case study. The main point
I would like to make is that theories, models, and EFTs are indispensible tools in
scientific research. They complement each other in a way which will be analysed in
some more detail in Section 4.1. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 focus on the consequences for
the reductionism debate and the controversy about scientific explanation.
4.1. Pluralism and coherence
Generalising the results of the case study, the following picture of theorising in physics
emerges. Scientists use a variety of theoretical tools; among these tools are theories,
models and EFTs. All of them have specific functions, and all of these functions are
required.
This has consequences for the notorious debate about the final theory. Setting
aside worries that we will anyway never be in the position to write down this theory,
a final theory faces at least three problems. First, it will be ‘too far away’ from
the phenomena we experience directly or in a laboratory. A final theory is therefore
unlikely to provide a local understanding of these phenomena. Models and EFTs
are still needed for this. Second, the final theory cannot be applied without vari-
ous additional (model-) assumptions about the concrete system under investigation.
Besides, low-energy expansions have to be carried out in a systematic way. This is
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where EFTs will come in handy. And third, we will probably never arrive at a final
theory without a supporting scaffolding of various models and EFTs. This has been
the case for all theories of physics so far. So there is no reason to believe that things
will be different for a final theory.
Let us now consider whether models are likely to dominate theoretical science as
some philosophers of science think (see Cartwright, 1999). In our case study, none of
the models we looked at was taken seriously by scientists if there was not at least a
qualitative story which connected the model to a more fundamental theory. And even
before the formulation of QCD, physicists did not consider the plurality of nuclear
and hadron models to be a satisfactory state of affairs. Theories are needed to inspire
the development of models and to present a framework for the various models.
EFTs are also not likely to make the the other two tools obsolete. Although EFTs
share many of their functions with theories and models, they will not be able to fulfil
all of these functions. To illustrate this point, let us distinguish two cases. First,
there is a fundamental theory from which specific EFTs can be deduced. Then, of
course, the EFT depends on the fundamental theory which is then still an essential
part of our theorical account of the world. Second, there is no fundamental theory.
In this case the ‘recipe’ which is part of the bottom-up EFT ideology is to try and
construct a tower of EFTs. More and more new particles will be added to the theory,
all of them being ‘elementary’ in a certain sense, and all of them might couple to
all the other particles known so far. But the resulting theory will not be of much
value; it is simply too complicated, and its predictive power will go down just as the
predictive power of the Ptolemaic system went down when more and more epicycles
were added (see Forster, 2000). Instead, theorists will search for a more fundamental
theory which will reduce the contingency that goes along with the tower-construction
strategy.
The upshot of all this is that theories, models and EFTs are each indispensable
tools of theoretical research in physics. But how are they related? Obviously there
are logical contradictions between various models, and also between QCD and EFTs.
Nevertheless, they all hang together in some sense. Sometimes there is an approxi-
mate deductive relation between, for example, QCD with an EFT at a given energy
scale. In the framework of Chiral Perturbation Theory, both are related through
an ontological bridge (Rohrlich, 2000), i.e. the identification of the terms involving
quark degrees of freedom in the Lagrangian density of QCD with the bosonic field
U(x). But the connections are not always so tight. Sometimes there is only a plau-
sible story which relates the vocabularies of a model and QCD and which sets the
model in the bigger framework provided by a theory. This story can be interpreted
as a semantic bridge between the model and the theory. There is a whole continuum
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of relations between theories, models and EFTs which range from strict reductive
relations through ontological bridges to rather vague associations through semantical
bridges. It is these bridges which integrate all these approaches in a coherent whole
(note that coherence comes in degrees!). It is tempting to reconstruct this picture in
terms of the probabilistic model of the coherence of a belief set suggested in Bovens
and Hartmann (2000) and developed in Bovens and Hartmann (forthcoming). The
various bridges between a model M and a theory T , for example, could then be
modelled by the conditional probability P (M |T )21. While this discussion refers to
the statics of scientific theorising (how do the theories and models at a given time
hang together?), a discussion of the role of considerations concerning coherence in the
dynamics of successive scientific theories can be found in Hartmann (forthcoming).
4.2. Reduction and emergence
The issue of reduction is probably the one which so far has got most attention in
the philosophical literature about EFTs. Much of this debate relates to the radical
conclusions Cao and Schweber draw in their article from 1993. The authors claim to
have ‘found that the recent developments support a pluralism in theoretical ontology,
an antifoundationalism in epistemology and an antireductionism in methodology’ (p.
69). I will evaluate these claims on the basis of the case study presented in the last
section.
First, ontological pluralism. This thesis is based on the observation that empir-
ical reality seems to be organised in a multitude (infinity?) of quasi-autonomous
layers. Each layer has its own ontology, and this ontology is to a considerable ex-
tent independent of the physics at higher energies. Only when the probing energy
approaches the cut-off of a given layer, do effects of the higher layers turn out to
have some influence. This influence might lead to a renormalisation of the mass and
charge parameters, but it might also lead to the insight that the ontology used so
far is not really fundamental. Nuclei turned out to be composed of nucleons and
pions, and nucleons and pions turned out to be composed of quarks and gluons. Cao
and Schweber’s claim of ontological pluralism rests on the assumptions, as Robinson
(1992) has pointed out, ‘that we can build up our ontological commitments in QFT
only by the method of first identifying the referring terms of the theory we accept.
But to accept this form of realism—theoretical realism—is to deny that we can build
up our ontological commitments through experiment in the absence of theory’ (p.
21Given the prior probabilities for M and T , P (M) and P (T ), P (T |M) can be obtained by Bayes
Theorem.
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403). I would not go as far as Robinson and subscribe to some variant of entity re-
alism. Rather, I would point to the role which other theories and their interrelations
play when it comes to establishing the ontology of the world. And given these other
theories and their interrelations it seems clear that ontological pluralism can at best
be defended as a pragmatic thesis.22 We are not trapped in the language game of
one theory. Given these other theories it might be interesting to take EFTs as a
case study in emergence. How do the properties of nucleons, for example, emerge
from the complicated interplay of quarks and gluons? This is a physics problem, and
the role of symmetry breaking mechanisms has to be addressed in detail. It should
also be noted that Cao and Schweber’s talk of quasi-autonomous domains rests on
the validity of the decoupling theorem. As I have explained in Section 2.2.3, this
theorem can only be proven if there is a underlying renormalisable theory and if the
energy scales of the particles separate. While the second assumption might not be
fulfilled empirically, the first assumption renders many of Cao and Schweber’s more
radical conclusions implausible since they are based on the assumption that there is
no underlying theory.
Second, epistemological antifoundationalism. According to this thesis, quasi-
autonomous layers do not only have their own ontology, but also have their own
‘fundamental’ theory. Since none of the layers is distinguished, none of the theories
is the fundamental one. There is no foundation for all other theories, and there is
no (and there will never be a) final theory which entails all other theories. Cao and
Schweber know that this is a metaphysical thesis, but they think that it is well sup-
ported by the practice of science. And indeed, a final theory seems to be as far away
as it was twenty years ago. But this, of course, does not imply that there will never
be a final theory. Leaving metaphysical questions aside, it seems to be philosophi-
cally more interesting to examine the formal relations between the theories, models
and EFTs we have already. As I argued in Section 4.1, the relation between some
underlying theory and an EFT can be reconstructed along the lines of Rohrlich’s
(2000) two-step model: first, a deductive relation between the two formalisms has to
be obtained. This typically involves approximations and a limiting process. Second,
ontological bridges between the incommensurable concepts of both theories have to
be established. This model, designed to account for the relation between mature
theories, does not help to analyse the relation between a model and a theory, which
is typically much more involved. This calls for detailed case studies.
Third, methodological antireductionism. This position advocates the bottom-up
EFT research strategy which is also favoured by many pragmatically-minded physi-
22For another account of ontological pluralism see Rohrlich (1988).
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cists. Howard Georgi, for example, writes:
The philosophical question underlying old-fashioned renormalizability is
this: How does this process end?
It is possible, I suppose, that at some very large energy scale, all nonrenor-
malizable interactions disappear, and the theory is simply renormalizable
in the old sense. This seems unlikely, given the difficulty with gravity.
It is possible that the rules change dramatically, as in string theory.
It may even be possible that there is no end, simply more and more scales
as one goes to higher and higher energy.
Who knows?
Who cares?
In addition to being a great convenience, effective field theory allows us
to ask all the really scientific questions that we want to ask without com-
mitting ourselves to a picture of what happens at arbitrarily high energy
(Georgi, 1993, p. 215).
Georgi recommends the bottom-up EFT strategy for pragmatic reasons. Unlike a
final theory, EFTs can be systematically tested experimentally, and this is taken to
be a feature any acceptable scientific theory should have:
My personal suspicion is that Nature is much more imaginative than we
are. If we theorists approach her study with the proper respect, if we
recognize that we are parasites who must live on the hard work of our
experimental friends, then our field will remain healthy and prosper. But
if we allow ourselves to be beguiled by the siren call of the ’ultimate’
unification at distances so small that our experimental friends cannot
help us, then we are in trouble, because we will lose that crucial process
of pruning of irrelevant ideas which distinguishes physics from so many
other less interesting human activities (Georgi, 1989, p. 457).
Georgi does not commit himself to a view concerning the possible existence of a
final theory. Whether it exists or not is not a question which can be settled in the
laboratory. Maybe the tower of EFTs never ends. It would, however, be a mistake
to stop taking the possibility of a final theory into account. Michael Redhead also
argues this point:
[F]rom a point of view of methodology of science a recurring theme has
been the search for an ultimate underlying order characterized by simplic-
ity and symmetry that lies behind and explains the confusing complexity
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of the phenomenal world. To subscribe to the new EFT programme is
to give up on this endeavour and retreat to a position that is admittedly
more cautious and pragmatic and closer to experimental practice, but is
somehow less intellectually exciting. Perhaps one should not allow such
considerations to enter into one’s evaluation of a scientific programme,
but to my own taste, the regulative ideal of an ultimate theory of every-
thing remains a powerful aesthetic ingredient motivating the existence of
the greatest intellectual ingenuity in the pursuit of what may admittedly,
in itself, be an illusory goal. But that after all is the proper function of
regulative ideals (Redhead, 1999, p. 40)
4.3. Explanation and understanding
One of the major aims of science is to explain phenomena. Although the concept
of explanation is pretty vague, an acceptable explanation should show (1) how the
phenomenon under consideration reached its present state and (2) how it fits into a
larger theoretical framework. Although these two requirements do not exclude each
other, it remains to be seen if both can be fulfilled by the same scientific theory
or model. This is not clear to start with, and philosophical theories of explanation
therefore usually concentrate on one of these requirements—a task which turns out
to be hard enough as the controversial nature of the debate over the last four decades
or so impressively shows (Salmon, 1989).
According to the causal/mechanical account, pioneered by Salmon and others (see
Salmon, 1998), a phenomenon is explained by providing a mechanism which produces
the effect under consideration. This mechanism is often given by a model (or an EFT
for that matter), as the MIT-Bag Model illustrates. Here quarks are confined to
a hard sphere in which they can move freely apart from occasional bounces off the
inner side of the bag, a situation which can be easily visualised classically (see Section
3.1.2). The mass of the proton, for example, can then be determined by summing up
the kinetic energies of the quarks and the potential energy of the bag. Explanations
of this kind produce local understanding, but lack global understanding because no
general principles are required to specify the mechanism.
According to the unification account, developed by Friedman and elaborated by
Kitcher (1989), a successful explanation fits the explanandum in a general frame-
work. This view, which is a distant descendant of the original Hempel–Oppenheim
account, supports the intuition that something is explained if it is integrated in a
larger theoretical context. Explanations of this kind are provided by theories such as
QCD. An explanation of the mass of the proton, for example, goes like this: there
are quarks and gluons coupled to a state with the quantum numbers of the proton
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and interacting in a very complicated way. Deductions from the Lagrangian density
of QCD, facilitated by high-powered computers, then yield the result of 938 MeV.
As I have argued in Section 3.1.1, this account does not produce local understand-
ing. By integrating the proton in a bigger framework it produces, however, global
understanding.
I think that the question which of the two accounts of explanation is the right one
is misguided. The case study presented in Section 3 has shown that both accounts
complement and interact with each other. The account of scientific explanation I
consider to be in accordance with scientific practice is therefore a pluralist one: science
studies a given phenomenon from various theoretical perspectives, all of which reveal
some explanatory information about the phenomenon in question. Putting all of
them together should result in a coherent explanatory account of the phenomenon.
It should be noted that Salmon (1998, pp. 73f) also acknowledges a rapprochement
of the causal/mechanical account and the unification account of scientific explanation
in his recent book.
5 Conclusions
Science is a complex and involved activity. All simple reconstructions of it will prob-
ably fail. Generalisations based on the work on theory unification in particle physics,
for example, are as hasty as the philosophical conclusions some now draw from the
current interest in EFTs among physicists. Science usually does not address issues
such as unity, reductionism, and what the characteristics of a good explanation are.
Rather, scientists use a plurality of interrelated conceptual tools, and explanations
are obtained by attacking a phenomenon from a variety of theoretical perspectives. It
is this pluralism of tools which is good for science and which makes science flourish.
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